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Rethinking Federalism
Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Federalism is a founding political principle of the U.S. Constitution and one ofour country's recent intellectual exports. In Europe, the former Soviet Union,South Africa, and elsewhere, the view that effective government will involve a
well-chosen mix of local and central governmental decision-making is now accepted.
Federalism questions—how many local and state governments there should be, how they
will be represented in the central government, and how policy responsibilities should be
allocated between the central government and the lower tiers—are once again a central
research concern of constitutional lawyers, political scientists, and economists alike.1
America's federalism debates were initially resolved by the U.S. Constitution.
The resolution of the tension over which levels of government should do what has
evolved during the past two centuries: from a period of "dualism" (1790–1860) in
which states and the central government had comparable responsibilities; through
an early period of "centralizing federalism" (1860–1933) in which the still modest
federal responsibilities grew; through a later time of "cooperative federalism"
(1933–1964), which marked a substantial growth in social programs arising out of
the Depression; and finally to a period of "creative federalism" since 1964 in which
1
 For a presentation of our views on the current debates in federalism, see Inman and Rubinfeld (1996b,
1997). For other perspectives on current research on federalism, see Bednar and Eskridge (1994) on
constitutional issues; Bermann (1994) on subsidiarity and the European Union; Bird, Ebel, and Wallich
(1995) on federalist issues in the former Soviet Union; Ahmad and McLure (1996) on federalism in the
new South Africa; and Rivlin (1992) on a federalism approach to leading U.S. policy issues.
• Robert P. Inman is Professor of Finance and Economics, Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Research Associate, National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Daniel L. Rubinfeld is Robert L. Bridges Professor
of Law and Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, California.
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the federal government has taken a direct and active role in the problems of state
and local governments (Scheiber, 1969).
This most recent period of creative federalism was spurred in part by Walter
Heller and Joseph Pechman's call in the 1960s for general revenue sharing from
the federal government to the states. Heller and Pechman feared that progressive
federal taxation would lead to growing federal budget surpluses and a "fiscal drag"
on the economy; their solution was to share these surpluses with the more fiscally
needy state and local sector (Heller, 1966; Perloff and Nathan, 1968). What proved
particularly "creative" about the period of creative federalism, however, were the
arguments for additional federal grants-in-aid offered by state and local government
officials and their elected Washington colleagues (Beer, 1972). From 1962 to 1976,
the number of separate federal grants programs to state and local governments
increased from 160 in 1962 to 412 by 1976 (ACIR, 1978, pp. 25, 32), and the amount
of money allocated by these programs over this time rose from $42 billion to
$169 billion (in 1996 dollars). From 1976 to 1996, total federal grants to state and
local governments has risen an additional $46 billion to $215 billion (in 1996 dol-
lars), a real growth rate for that time of about 1.2 percent per annum (Council of
Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President, 1997, Table B-83). This
expansion of centrally financed grants-in-aid drives a significant fiscal wedge be-
tween the costs and benefits of financing state and local governments.2
There are currendy a number of efforts to check the drift toward centralization
in the U.S. fiscal structure and reallocate funding responsibilities for redistributive
services from Washington to state capitols. Of course, the current initiatives are not
new; many of them date back to the "new federalism" espoused during Reagan's
first term. It is too early to tell, but it is possible that these current reforms will mark
the beginning of a new period in U.S. federalism. If so, this newest federalism period
is likely to be built on an intellectual foundation that reflects recent work in public
economics, law and economics, and political economy. In what follows, we sketch
out our view of the principles that could form that foundation.
Three Principles of Federalism
Three alternative principles, or models, of federalism can be identified in con-
temporary debates. In considering the implications of these principles, it is helpful
to bear in mind that those who value a federal system typically do so for some mix
of three reasons: it encourages an efficient allocation of national resources; it fosters
political participation and a sense of the democratic community; and it helps to pro-
tect basic liberties and freedoms. The means for implementing these three objectives
2
 Quigley and Rubinfeld (1996) offer an empirical overview of the changing system of intergovernmental
grants. Inman (1988) has estimated that this fiscal wedge between those paying the costs of public services
and those receiving the benefits created by federal grants has resulted in a "Harberger triangle" of
allocative inefficiency equal to about $.17 per dollar of federal aid distributed.
Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld 45
involve decisions about the institutions of federalism: the number of lower-tier gov-
ernments, their representation in the central government, and the assignment of
policy responsibilities between the vertical tiers of government.
Economic Federalism
The principle of economic federalism prefers the most decentralized structure of government
capable of internalizing all economic externalities, subject to the constitutional constraint that
all central government policies be decided by an elected or appointed "central planner."
This view elevates the goal of economic efficiency to the highest priority; only
if two federal structures are equally efficient in the allocation of resources do other
goals of federalism—political participation or the protection of individual rights—
come into consideration. Oates's (1972) classic Fiscal Federalism still provides the
most complete description of economic federalism; essentially, the central govern-
ment is assigned responsibility for those public activities distinguished by significant
externalities involving spatially dispersed populations, while local governments have
responsibility for those public activities for which such spillovers are limited or
absent. Decentralization to small jurisdictions is justified because, as Oates (1994,
p. 130) put it more recendy, "The tailoring of outputs to local circumstances will,
in general, produce higher levels of well-being than a centralized decision to pro-
vide some uniform level of output across all jurisdictions . . ."
The appropriate number of local (or lower-tier) governments is specified so
that all economies of scale in the provision of public services to households are just
exhausted.3 When public services are pure public goods for which the marginal cost
of adding another user will be zero (national defense, basic research), or when
there are inefficiencies arising from externalities across jurisdictions, then under
economic federalism the central government will be assigned responsibility for
those services. However, for public services that become congested as more house-
holds use the service—that is, to accommodate additional households at current
service levels, additional public facilities must be provided—then relatively small
communities are more likely to provide the service efficiently. When the average
cost per user of providing a given level of a "congestible" government service just
equals the marginal cost of adding one more user, then the community has reached
its efficient size. Important public services such as education, police and fire pro-
tection, sanitation, recreation, and even public health can be produced efficiently
by relatively small communities, perhaps as small as 10,000 households.4
3
 This statement assumes that there are sufficient number of each "preference type" of household to
achieve the efficient level of public goods provisions. If there are too few households of a particular type
then one must balance allocative efficiency—satisfying demands—against technical efficiency—reaching
the minimal efficient scale for the community.
4
 On education, see Hanushek (1986); on police services, see Craig (1987); on fire services, see Dun-
combe and Yinger (1993); on parks and recreation, see Edwards (1990); on sanitation, see Gonzalez,
Means, and Mehay (1993). For services where efficient production will require larger user populations,
small communities can band together to form purchasing cooperatives, although writing contracts for
such cooperatives is a subtle matter; see Williamson (1976). State governments often sanction such
"contracts" when allowing local governments to form special districts.
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Tiebout (1956) presented the first systematic argument as to how a decentral-
ized federal structure could be used to achieve economic efficiency in the provision
of public services; Bewley (1981) made Tiebout's insights precise. In the Tiebout
economy, most public services are assumed to be congestible and efficiently pro-
vided by small communities. Thus, lower-tier governments are given significant pol-
icy responsibilities. Households are assumed to be freely mobile; they shop among
local jurisdictions for that community which offers their preferred package of ser-
vices, taxes, and regulations. In this institutional structure, if any jurisdiction were
to provide public services inefficiently, households would move to another jurisdic-
tion that was more efficient. It is this variety and the pressure it imposes on the
unfavored communities and states which Justice Brandeis most likely had in mind
when advocating local and state governments as "laboratories" for the design of
public policies.5 However, when there are significant intercommunity interdepen-
dencies (like pure public goods or spillovers), Tiebout's competition among small
governments may result in economically inefficient public policies. Potential ex-
amples of such inefficiencies include low income assistance (Gramlich, 1985), reg-
ulation (Oates and Schwab, 1986), and local income and business taxes (Inman
and Rubinfeld, 1996a). The principle of economic federalism assigns the central
government the task of correcting such misallocations.
The structure of central government decision-making under economic fed-
eralism is relatively simple. A single central planner is elected and charged with
providing public goods and correcting intercommunity spillovers. The planner
can rely on the voting mechanism to reveal voter (presumably, the median voter)
preferences or perhaps apply more sophisticated revelation mechanisms such
as auctions (Grossman and Helpman, 1994) or demand-revealing processes
(Laffont, 1987).
The central government can provide public goods and correct spillovers in
either of two ways: provide the good directly or mandate outcomes (a "quantity"
control),6 or subsidize or tax the local governments to provide the efficient levels
of the activity on their own (a "price" control). Central governments currently use
both approaches. In the United States, national defense, old-age social security, and
environmental protection are directly provided or mandated by the central govern-
ment, while low-income assistance, interstate highways, and basic research are
largely managed through central government price subsidies or matching grants
to state and local agencies or nonprofit organizations.
Which of the two approaches—quantity controls or price subsidies—is to be
5
 "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country," Justice Brandeis (dissenting) in New State Ice Co. v. Liebman 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932).
6
 The choice between direct provision and mandates is primarily a distribution issue. Mandates allocate
the costs of the national policy to the local jurisdiction, while direct provision or lump-sum grants allocate
the costs to taxpayers nationally. The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Printz v. U.S. (1997 U.S.
Lexis 4044 [June 27, 1997]) overturned the federal unfunded mandate that state governments provide
background checks on future gun owners in part for this distributional reason.
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preferred by the central government depends upon the particular economic cir-
cumstances of the public good or intercommunity spillover. Direct provision of the
public good or mandates by the central government will be preferred when the
social marginal benefit curve of the good or corrected spillover is relatively inelastic
and the social marginal cost curve is relatively elastic (Weitzman, 1974; Inman,
1982). Lump-sum grants targeted to a particular service can also be used in this
case; if tightly monitored, targeted lump-sum grants are functionally equivalent to
direct provision.
Untargeted lump-sum grants may also have a role to play in the efficient federal
economy. For example, to ensure the efficient location of private sector workers
across fiscally competitive jurisdictions, lump-sum transfers from the residents of
the fiscally favored community to the residents in the fiscally disadvantaged locality
may be needed (Boadway and Flatters, 1982; Myers, 1990). Further, if local tax
administration is inadequate, it may make sense for central government to collect
tax revenues for, and then transfer grants revenues to, state and local governments.
To avoid the moral hazard of having local governments view such transfers as
"blank checks" from the central government, the amount of such grants should
be firmly tied to a publicly reviewed and locally decided tax rate. There are even
circumstances where efficiency requires a grant from local government to the central
government. Boadway and Keen (1996) present an analysis with tax interdepen-
dencies, in which tax decisions by local government increase the marginal cost of
raising central government revenues. In this case, a grant from local governments
to the center internalizes the costs that those governments impose on the central
government. Finally, intergovernmental transfers can be used to improve the equity
performance of the local public sector. For example, a state may decide that school
districts should receive a certain amount of money depending direcdy on the rate
at which they tax themselves—not on the tax base. This "tax base equalization aid"
would involve transfers from districts with high tax bases to those with lower bases
(LeGrand, 1975). The case for such transfers is strengthened if certain local public
services such as education are considered "merit wants" (Musgrave, 1987); cate-
gorical matching grants can be designed to increase their provision (Inman and
Rubinfeld, 1979).
For most economists, the principle of economic federalism, with its recom-
mended institutions of competitive decentralized local governments and a strong
central government to provide pure public goods and control intercommunity ex-
ternalities, essentially defines what federalism is about. However, the principle has
had only mixed success as a guide to economic policy. Its strength has been to
articulate how fiscal competition among decentralized local governments can en-
sure the efficient provision of congestible public services; several recent studies offer
empirical support for the proposition that competitive local governments do pro-
vide citizens the public services they want at the lowest cost (Rrueckner, 1982; Rerg-
strom, Roberts, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro, 1988; Gramlich and Rubinfeld, 1982; Rub-
infeld, 1987). The primary weakness of the principle of economic federalism has
been to advocate the central government as the only institution best able to provide
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pure public goods and correct interjurisdictional externalities. With our growing
understanding of how central government policies are decided, the deference
of economic federalism to a strong central government may be excessive. For
example, there often appears to be little connection between actual interjuris-
dictional spillovers and the size or structure of federal grants received (Oates,
1994; Inman, 1988). Alternative principles of federalism, ones which explicitly
recognize the potential failings of central government policy-making, should be
considered too.
Cooperative Federalism
The principle of cooperative federalism is to prefer the most decentralized structure of
government capable of internalizing all economic externalities, subject to the constitutional
constraint that all central government policies are agreed to unanimously by the elected rep-
resentatives from each of the lower-tier governments.
The insights of cooperative federalism spring from the law and economics
literature. Like economic federalism, cooperative federalism embraces the goal of
economic efficiency as its central objective and advocates the use of lower-tier gov-
ernments to provide congestible public services. However, cooperative federalism
is much less optimistic as to the ability of a central government alone to resolve the
intercommunity inefficiencies which might arise. Thus, the principle of cooperative
federalism requires all central government policies to be unanimously approved by
the elected representatives from each of the lower-tier governments. Since central
government political agreements will be achieved through bargaining between all
affected parties, any central government policies which are unanimously approved
will likely be Pareto-improving. These agreements can take place directly within a
central legislative body (Wittman, 1989) or through intergovernmental agreements
between subsets of local governments which are then approved by the central gov-
ernment or by some agreed-upon neutral party, like an appointed court (Ellickson,
1979).
Agreements between lower-tier governments will require those who are
harmed by the fiscal policy of some other jurisdiction to "compensate" the resi-
dents inside that jurisdiction for removing the offending policy.7 As Coase (1960)
and others have pointed out, when there are sufficient benefits to the outside res-
idents from removing a harmful policy, then compensation can be paid to inside
residents so that all residents—outside and inside—are better off. In practice, such
compensation would be paid through an intercommunity agreement in which ju-
risdictions raise taxes and pay compensation to their neighboring governments,
7
 This specification of the interstate bargaining assigns the "property rights" to public policy to the
government passing the policy. The alternative is to assign property rights to the affected governments;
in this case, governments would have veto power over the actions of others. Each assignment has its
problems when information is less than perfect, raising the possibility of extortion. Most constitutions
assign the property rights to policy to the governments passing the laws.
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which in turn return those funds to groups initially favored by the inefficient policy.8
Thus, cooperative federalism views the primary function of the central government
as encouraging and enforcing interjurisdictional contracts to provide pure public
goods and to correct the failings of lower-tier fiscal competition.
There a number of reasons, however, that cause us to be skeptical that interjur-
isdictional Coasian bargains can be effective. Arguably the most important source of
bargaining failure is the inability of the parties to agree how the economic surplus
generated by the bargaining process should be divided (Cooter, 1982), since this may
well involve irreconcilable ideas of fairness (Hoffman and Spitzer, 1985; Sutton, 1987).
Furthermore, Coasian bargainers may make poor estimates of each other's threat point
or miscalculate the chances that the other party will accept a compromise offer, thus
taking a hard line that prevents agreement. Unless costs and benefits are common
knowledge, all sides are likely to seek strategic advantage by concealing information
(Myerson and Satterthwaite, 1983). Jurisdictions being asked to change may overstate
the compensation they require for changing. Finally, if many governments are adversely
affected by one state's public policy, the affected jurisdictions may have a difficult time
determining how much each is willing to pay, since each individual jurisdiction will
face a free-rider incentive to understate how it is affected and what it would pay, hoping
that the other jurisdictions will bear the costs of the change. Strategic interplay becomes
ever more complicated as the number of bargaining jurisdictions increases beyond two
or the bargain is one of many (Mailath and Postlewaite, 1990).
Enforceability of agreements can also be a problem. In principle, intergovern-
mental agreements are legally enforceable (Ellickson, 1979), but in practice, when the
violating party is a state or local government, the central government's only recourse
may be military action. When the ultimate enforcement mechanism becomes so costly,
all sides face incentives to renege on prior agreements.9 When jurisdictions are tempted
to renege, there is less incentive to reach agreements in the first place.
How well has cooperative federalism done in providing public goods or con-
trolling intercommunity externalities? The overall record has not been impressive.
Even agreements among few jurisdictions often fail to achieve fully efficient out-
comes (Coates and Munger, 1995), and U.S. states often engage in non-cooperative
behavior when significant benefits might arise from cooperation (Kolstad and Wo-
lak, 1983). In fact, the limitations of cooperative federalism were evident from our
nation's beginning. The U.S. Constitution was largely a response to the inability of
8
 One important application of this Coasian approach to intercommunity externalities is found in the
work of Myers (1990) and Krelove (1992), who argue central government grants-in-aid are not necessary
to correct misallocations arising from excessive, fiscally-induced relocations. Rather, the "over-
populated" community has an incentive to pay the residents of the "under-populated" communitynot
to relocate, and a Coasian agreement to this effect can be written between the two communities to
correct the market failure. No central government aid is needed.
9
 This point was well-appreciated by Hamilton in his critique of the Articles of Confederation in Federalist
15: "The consequences of this (The Articles of Confederation) is, that though in theory their resolutions
concerning those objects are laws, constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet in practice
they are mere recommendations, which the States observe or disregard at their option."
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the Articles of Confederation to achieve agreement among the states for financing
the defense of the newly independent colonies (Rakove, 1989). As a consequence,
Article I, Section 8 of our Constitution explicitly allocates the task of providing that
defense to the new national Congress. Nationally provided social insurance, the
other major expenditure activity of the U.S. central government, arose too from a
failure of U.S. states to cooperatively respond to growing unemployment. During
the Great Depression, rather than working together to provide a common level of
social insurance, the states chose instead to act alone to keep as many of their
current jobs as possible through low taxes and low unemployment assistance (Pat-
terson, 1969, ch. 2 and 3), a problem which still exists today (Helms, 1985; Feldstein
and Vaillant, 1994). Under Roosevelt's New Deal, the national government decided
to fund some insurance systems directly (the Social Security Act of 1935) and to
use matching grants to encourage states to take on the task of providing income
assistance for the indigent elderly, the blind, and mothers with dependent children
(Patterson, 1969, p. 88; Wallis, 1984).
Finally, the macro-management of the economy, perhaps government's single
most important regulatory activity, can also be viewed as the response of the central
government to a failure of Coasian bargaining among the states. Individual states
do have some power to use fiscal policy to stimulate their economies (Gramlich,
1987; Inman and Rubinfeld, 1994), but the fact that most states are small, open
economies severely limits their ability to implement effective aggregate demand
fiscal policies. Only an agreement among the many states to coordinate their fiscal
policies will work. The struggle in Europe to form a viable monetary union illus-
trates how difficult such agreements on appropriate macroeconomic policies
can be.
To be completely clear, our point here is not that the levels of central govern-
ment defense spending, social insurance, or macroeconomic stability have always
been optimal; rather, it is that if the nation had waited for states to agree unani-
mously on such policies, economic outcomes would almost surely have been far
worse. Our reading of the historical and contemporary evidence does not provide
much support for the claim that lower-tier governments can solve their important
collective action problems on their own through unanimous Coasian agreements.
If economic federalism seems too biased in favor of centralization, cooperative
federalism seems to bias the fiscal constitution too far in the other direction.
Democratic (Majority-Rule) Federalism
The principle of democratic (or majority-rule) federalism is to prefer the most decentralized
structure of government capable of internalizing all economic externalities, subject to the con-
stitutional constraint that all central government policies are agreed to by a simple (51 percent)
majority of elected representatives from lower-tier governments.
Like the principles of economic and cooperative federalism, democratic fed-
eralism also embraces the use of lower-tier governments to provide congestible
public services, and again, the number of lower-tier governments is determined by
the technology of public services. With regard to its views on the economic perfor-
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mance of the central government, however, democratic federalism stands between
economic federalism and cooperative federalism. Unlike economic federalism, it
does not implicitly assume that the central government will provide public goods
and regulate interjurisdictional spillovers efficiently. In contrast to cooperative fed-
eralism, only majority-rule—not unanimity—is required to make a decision. Of
course, there is no guarantee that policies chosen by a majority-rule legislature will
be efficient either. Democratic federalism seeks to balance the potential efficiency
gains of greater centralization in a world of local spillovers and pure public goods
against the inefficiencies which might arise when a democratic central legislature
sets policies (Tullock, 1969; Inman and Rubinfeld, 1996b). Considering this trade-
off requires a specification of the federal institutions of government. What is the
extent of local representation in the central legislature? Should there be an inde-
pendently elected executive with veto powers? How should policy responsibilities
be assigned to the different tiers of government?
In thinking about how the institutions of a democratic central government
might be specified, it is useful to contrast two commonly used approaches to leg-
islative decision-making. The first assigns agenda-setting powers to a small subset
of members, say the speaker of the house or a key legislative committee. Other
members in the legislature then simply vote—up or down—on the items in the
approved agenda. Most likely, policies will be approved by a bare majority—a min-
imal winning coalition—in this strong agenda-setter legislature (Baron and Fere-
john, 1989). A second strategy shares agenda-setting powers among all members,
giving each legislator a right to select a most preferred policy in that policy area
most germane to the legislator's constituents. This second approach to legislative
decision-making involves each legislator deferring to the preferred policies of all
other legislators, provided the other legislators defer to the legislator's own policy
requests (Weingast, 1979; Niou and Ordeshook, 1985; Weingast and Marshall,
1988). The guiding norm here is one of deference—"You scratch my back, I'll
scratch yours"—and it typically results in legislative proposals which are ap-
proved nearly unanimously. For this reason such legislatures are often called
"universalistic."
There are reasons to believe that minimum winning coalition legislatures may
be more economically efficient than universalistic legislatures (Inman and Fitts,
1990). But this alternative environment will not arise unless the representatives
themselves prefer to do business in a minimum winning coalition environment. A
single legislator choosing between the closed rules of a bare majority, minimal-
winning-coalition legislature or the more open rules of a universalistic legislature
managed by a norm of deference will typically favor the more open rules. With
closed rules, you must belong to a winning coalition to have your constituent's
projects approved; without strong political parties or additional side-deals, the prob-
ability of being in that coalition is at best 50:50. In constituent-based politics, it may
be better to have the sure slice of a smaller pie under universalism, than run the
risk of no slice at all under minimal-winning-coalition politics.
Universalistic legislatures operating under a norm of deference run a signifi-
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cant risk that their chosen policies will be economically inefficient. The essential
problem is that each legislator chooses a program that will disproportionately ben-
efit their own constituency, with the costs paid by residents of all jurisdictions.
Because of this cross-subsidy, each legislator has an incentive to ask for too much
of their own preferred good or regulation (Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen, 1981;
Persson and Tabellini, 1994). The subsidy becomes larger, and the potential inef-
ficiencies greater, the greater is legislative representation, or equivalently, the
smaller are the legislative jurisdictions relative to the nation as a whole. The legis-
lative norm of deference allows these inefficiencies to stand, not just for one juris-
diction but for all jurisdictions represented in the legislature. Inman (1988) and
Inman and Fitts (1990) offer some tentative evidence on the magnitude of the
allocative inefficiencies created by such a legislature.
What can be done to strike a more appropriate balance between the gains of
centralized assignment and the costs of this assignment when the legislature is
inefficient? One set of options is to reform the central government's legislative
process in ways that would discourage an inefficient universalistic legislature, per-
haps by strengthening the hand of political parties over members' decisions (Al-
drich, 1995) or by increasing executive powers (Fitts and Inman, 1992).
Alternatively, one might adjust the institutions of federalism. For example, if
given the legislative process and size of the legislature, the assignment of policy
responsibility to the central government is less efficient than retaining those re-
sponsibilities at the local level, even with associated spillovers, then constitutional
assignment can reallocate the activity to the lower tiers of government. In effect,
this is what President Reagan sought to achieve through the informal influence of
his presidency with his 1982 budget and his "new federalism" reforms. However,
since the Reagan reforms asked the central legislature to surrender influence over
spending, it is perhaps not surprising these efforts did not survive his presidency.10
Another institution of federalism that can be adjusted is the extent of repre-
sentation of local governments to the national legislature. Does every community
have direct representation or does the constitution combine communities, with
groups of local jurisdictions electing one representative? If the central govern-
ment's legislature operates under a norm of deference, economic inefficiencies are
likely to be greater the larger the legislature and the smaller the unit of represen-
10
 Formal constitutional assignment of functions to lower-tier governments might also be tried, but such
constraints, when effective, are often quite "heavy-handed." Either the assignment excludes everything
from the central level or, if exceptions are written, potentially nothing. Recent efforts to write an effective,
but flexible, federal balanced budget amendment is a case in point. The current Rehnquist Supreme
Court is struggling to find a more nuanced interpretation of assignment in our Constitution. Since Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (469 U.S. 528 [1985]), the Court has abandoned trying to
define assignment by governmental function. In United States v. Lopez (115 S. Ct. 1624 [1995]) the Court
embraced a process approach to evaluating congressional actions which affects states. The Court now
requires national laws to explicitly state a national interest (for example, interstate commerce) being
rationally served by the legislation. This does not seem a particularly high hurdle. Inman and Rubinfeld
(1997) suggest another approach to raising the bar using a Federalism Impact Statement (or "FIST").
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tation; so for efficiency, smaller legislatures and larger units of representation may
be preferred (Inman and Fitts, 1990; Gilligan and Matsusaka, 1995). The efficient
legislature is unlikely to be very small, however. Legislatures serve as bargaining
halls and help to reveal preferences. A small legislature puts all the burden for
preference revelation on the candidate election, losing the potential efficiency
gains which come with face-to-face deal-making. Setting the size of the efficient
legislature requires us to balance the gains from having more voices heard against
the risk that too many bargainers means only inefficient or unstable deals are done
(Buchanan and Tullock, 1962, ch. 7).11
Which Principle of Federalism Should One Choose?
Constitutions establish the rules for collective decision-making. The unique
contribution of a federal constitution is to allow for multiple tiers of governments,
each with a domain of policy responsibilities. Federal constitutions must specify the
number of lower-tier governments, the representation of those governments to the
central government, and the assignment of policy responsibilities between the up-
per and lower tiers.
For economic efficiency, all three principles of federalism embrace the logic
of the Tiebout model and the use of lower-tier governments to provide congestible
public services. It is in the specification of central government representation and
in the assignment of pure public goods and spillovers to the central government
that the three principles of federalism may disagree. Economic federalism has all
local governments select one central government representative—a "president-
planner"—and then assigns all pure public goods and spillovers as central respon-
sibilities. It is the job of the president-planner to set and administer central govern-
ment policies efficiently, presumably guided by principles of efficient (second-best)
public finance.12 Cooperative federalism gives each local government one
representative to the central government and then allows those representatives to
fashion Coasian agreements to improve the welfare of their citizens. Agreements
may involve all local governments—for example, an agreement to enforce
agreements—or only a subset of governments. Cooperative federalism assigns all
public goods and spillovers locally, unless local governments voluntarily agree to
centralize. Democratic federalism jointly decides representation and assignment as
part of an effort to balance the efficiency gains of central government provision
11
 Although Buchanan and Tullock's (1962) classic Calculus of Consent does not discuss federalism ex-
plicitly, they do advocate an approach to constitution-writing much like that suggested by democratic
federalism (p. 112): "As we have suggested, the costs of reaching agreement, of bargaining, are, from a
'social' point of view, wasteful. One means of reducing these costs is to organize collective activity in the
smallest units consistent with the extent of the externality that the collectivization is designed to
eliminate."
12
 The president-planner's objective may, or may not, correspond to an ethically appealing social welfare
function, but whatever the objective, the president-planner can be assumed to pursue it with the most
efficient use of the policy instruments available. For a discussion of how such a president-planner might
be chosen and set policies in a democracy, see Besley and Coate (1997).
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against the inefficiencies which might arise when central legislatures decide what
that level of provision should be (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1996b). Large legislatures
will do a good job representing preferences of all citizens but may foster inefficiently
large ("universalistic") budgets. Small legislatures are less representative but the
budgeting may be less prone to excessive spending.
However one evaluates the economic efficiency performance of federal con-
stitutions, it must be recognized that the federal institutions chosen will have im-
portant implications for political participation and the protection of individual
rights and liberties, two other constitutional values central to past and current fed-
eralism debates. James Madison's arguments in Federalist 10 for a strong but highly
representative central government as the best protector of individual rights helped
to define the representation and assignment outcomes in our Constitution. Current
concerns in the European Union over political participation and the Union's "dem-
ocratic deficit" may have a similar effect by elevating the European Parliament to
greater institutional importance in the new EU's constitution (Garrett and Tsebelis,
1996).
Finally, there are good reasons to think that efficiency, participation, and the
protection of individual rights may at times conflict, and that setting the institutions
of the federal constitution will require hard choices. For example, a strong central
government built on the principles of economic federalism or democratic feder-
alism with a small legislature is likely to be the relatively more efficient federal
structure for the provision of public goods and spillovers. However, such a structure
may shortchange the valued goal of political participation which is typically best
served by giving small local governments stronger central government representa-
tion and more policy responsibilities (Frug, 1980; Inman and Rubinfeld, 1997).
Individual rights might also be threatened by a strongly centralized federal consti-
tution, Madison's arguments not withstanding. Legal scholars concerned with the
protection of individual political rights (McConnell, 1987; Rapaczynski, 1986) have
strongly criticized from a rights perspective the Supreme Court's recent Garcia de-
cision giving the central government carte blanche for setting public policies,13
while Easterbrook (1983) and Weingast (1995) both argue forcefully for decen-
tralized policy assignments as the best means for protecting individual property
rights. Those charged with selecting a principle of federalism must understand and
then balance these potentially important tradeoffs between economic efficiency,
political participation, and individual liberties.
13
 After years of frustration in trying to establish a workable assignment principle based upon the Tenth
Amendment, the Supreme Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority (469 U.S. 528
[1985]) gave the task of deciding the allocation of federal and state policy responsibilities to the central
government, arguing that state representation in the U.S. Senate would adequately protect state policy
interests. Two more recent Supreme Court decisions have placed some modest limits of what Washington
can do. In United States v. Lopez (115 S. Ct. 1624 [1995]) the Court required Congress to make explicit
the connection between national regulations of state activities and a national objective, while in New York
v. United States (505 U.S. 144 [1992]) and more recently in Printz v. U.S. (1997 U.S. Lexis 4044 [June 27,
1997]), the Court overturned the use of unfunded mandates on the states.
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Welfare Reform: Budget Cutting or A New Federalism?
The U.S. Constitution is a broadly representative but centralized federal
constitution. In response to Madison's concerns that the new democracy be rep-
resentative of all the people, the Constitution requires representation of the
populace in the House of Representatives and equal voices for all the states in
the Senate. To avoid the collective action problems inherent in the Articles of
Confederation, the Constitution through the Tenth Amendment assigns all pol-
icy powers to the majority-rule central government. Ultimately, this represen-
tative central government will decide which tier of government will set America's
economic policies.
We may be at the start of a quiet revolution in Washington's view of how to
assign policies. In summer 1996, President Clinton signed the Personal Responsi-
bility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act of 1996, known more generally
as the Welfare Reform Act of 1996. The act has two primary objectives: 1) to reduce
welfare roles by providing families currently on welfare with the means and the
incentives to seek work; and 2) to end welfare's 60-year status as a nationally funded
entitlement.14 Of central interest to us here is the second objective, since it poten-
tially represents a significant shift in the responsibilities of different levels of gov-
ernment for the provision of low income assistance, and how Washington may wish
to manage our federal relations generally.
The Welfare Reform Act of 1996 has two potentially important consequences
for federal-state relations in the provision of low-income assistance; it saves the
federal government money and it breaks the federal-to-state-to-recipient entitle-
ment for low income assistance. Prior to the passage of the Welfare Reform Act,
the federal government shared directly in the financing of states' decisions for
welfare through an open-ended matching grant for aid to families with dependent
children (AFDC), for job training (JOBS), and for aid for homeless children (Emer-
gency Assistance). If the state spent more on welfare, the federal government shared
in that expenditure at the federally set matching rate. The Welfare Reform Act
replaced these matching aid programs with a single block grant called Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (hereafter TANF). TANF breaks the direct call of
states and their low income households on additional central government dollars.
Importantly, this shift from matching to block grants was not necessary to achieve
the budgetary savings of the Welfare Reform Act. Of the $54 billion that welfare
reform will save over the next six fiscal years, $46 billion will come from provisions
which deny Social Security Income (SSI) supplements and food stamps to legal
immigrants (U.S. House Committee on Ways and Means, 1996, p. 1332). The sav-
ings from the consolidation of AFDC, JOBS, and Emergency Assistance into the
TANF block grant equals only $7.8 billion over six years. To put it another way, the
14
 For an analysis in this journal of the possible success of the Welfare Reform Act in reaching its first
goal, encouraging work by current welfare recipients, see Blank (1997).
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same level of savings in federal spending from TANF could have been achieved
with an (approximate) 8 percent cut in federal matching rates, say from .50 to .46
for rich states and from .78 to .72 for poor states.15
These cost figures, together with much political rhetoric, suggest that the real
fiscal target of the Welfare Reform Act of 1996 was not lower federal spending, but
the federal-state relationship for how poverty dollars are budgeted. Since its incep-
tion during the Depression, AFDC had guaranteed each eligible individual (origi-
nally children only, but later mothers were included) a state-determined stipend
with state spending supported by an open-ended matching grant from the federal
government. Federal standards for a minimum level of the stipend and funding
through a federal, open-ended matching grant guaranteed at least minimal AFDC
payments to all eligible households. Higher state spending is allowed and the fed-
eral government will match that spending. Originally, the federal government
matched state spending at a uniform rate of $1 of federal money for each $2 of
state spending, implying a federal "matching rate" of .33. Subsequent reforms have
raised federal matching rates to .50 ($1 federal for each state $1) for the very richest
states and to .78 for the poorest states ($3.50 federal for each state $1). The welfare
reform ends this federal guarantee of fiscal support for state spending by consoli-
dating AFDC, JOBS, and Emergency Assistance into the TANF block grant. Replac-
ing welfare matching aid with the TANF block grant frees the federal budget from
the welfare entitlement and makes states responsible for the full cost of each ad-
ditional dollar spent on low income assistance.
Further, the Welfare Reform Act of 1996 gives states wide latitude to determine
program eligibility and benefits, and largely removes federal government regula-
tions for low income assistance. TANF dollars can be reallocated away from direct
income support to programs which promote job training, child care, prevention of
teen pregnancy, and marriage. Given these alternative uses of the TANF block
grant, TANF monies are likely to be highly fungible out of direct income support,
if that is what a state's politics prefers.16 The only requirements imposed on the
15
 This is only approximate, because a cut in the federal matching rate for state spending will reduce the
states' own spending and thus have "second-order" effects further reducing total federal outlays. These
second-order effects would be small. Craig and Inman (1986) estimate the price elasticity of own state
spending with respect to changes in the federal matching rate to equal .12; thus an 8 percent reduction
in the matching rate will reduce state spending by less than 1 percent.
16
 Legally, a state will be free to reallocate those dollars over 80 percent of the state's TANF allocation,
as the Welfare Reform Act of 1996 requires that 80 percent of the TANF allocation be spent on approved
welfare-related activities. Once the 80 percent target is met, TANF monies may be allocated to other
state activities outside the welfare budget, including general tax relief. However, state and local govern-
ments are very clever in labelling programs to circumvent federal regulations—one Pennsylvania high
school district reclassified fourth year AP Spanish as a bilingual language program to qualify for federal
low-income education aid—so that the Welfare Reform Act's maintenance of effort regulation may prove
only a weak, constraint. If so, state welfare spending will become fully fungible and each additional dollar
spent on welfare will imply an opportunity cost to the state of $1. Finally, TANF funding may diminish
in importance over time. While generous in the near-term, TANF funding is not indexed and there is
only modest protection if welfare roles rise during a deep recession. WRA 96 establishes a contingency
fund with $2 billion in reserves to be allocated through TANF when a recession occurs. The fund is
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states are those which restrict the size of the state welfare roles. TANF funds cannot
be used to support assistance for families whose members have received assistance
for five or more years, although states can exempt 20 percent of their caseload from
this requirement. Adults receiving TANF funds must "engage in work" within two
years; states may choose a shorter grace period. By 1997, 25 percent of single parents
receiving TANF funds (50 percent of two-parent families) must be engaged in work
for at least 20 hours per week; by 2002, 50 percent of single parents (90 percent of
two-parent families) must be working, although states retain some flexibility in de-
fining "work."
What will happen to low-income assistance now that fiscal responsibility has
been moved back to the states? Only tentative predictions can be drawn from the
numerous studies of state financing of AFDC spending. Two offsetting incentives
are at work. First, the Welfare Reform Act of 1996 eliminates AFDC's matching rates
for additional state spending, which raises the effective price (the net of matching
aid price) of an additional dollar of low-income assistance for a state from
(1 – matching rate) to 1; poor states will see the effective price of an additional
dollar of poverty assistance rise from .22 (= 1 –.78) to 1, while richer states will see
their prices rise from .5 (= 1 –.5) to 1.17 Even though most studies estimate modest
price elasticities of demand for welfare spending, ranging from –.02 to –.50 (Ribar
and Wilhelm, 1996), having the effective price of welfare increase by 354 percent
(for poor states) or 100 percent (for rich states) implies potentially large conse-
quences. For example, a price elasticity of –.20 would imply nearly a 70 percent
cut in spending in poor states and a 20 percent reduction in richer states.
On the other side, although the welfare reform removes the price incentive for
state welfare spending, it substitutes a block grant of a nearly equal dollar amount.
Direct estimates of the elasticity of welfare spending to lump-sum grants range from
.01 to .30, with lower estimates corresponding to more "fungible" grants-in-aid (Craig
and Inman, 1986; Inman, 1979). Using these estimates we expect the TANF block
grant equal to the state's current loss in matching aid to increase welfare spending in
poor states from 4 percent (for a block grant elasticity of .01) to perhaps as much as
30 percent (for a block grant elasticity of .30) and from 2 percent (.01 block grant
elasticity) to 20 percent (.30 block grant elasticity) in rich states.18
Combining these effects, a price elasticity of –.20 implies a decline of welfare
spending in the poor states from 40 to 66 percent (that is, a drop of 70 percent
from the price effect and an increase of either 4 or 30 percent from the TANF
modest, however; the $2 billion reserve would have covered only about one-third of the increase in AFDC
spending which occurred during the mild 1991–92 recession; see Blank (1997, p. 175).
17
 The precise specification of the price of welfare spending is a bit more involved, depending on which
political economy model and policy interactions are being estimated. For a useful review of the various
price specifications for state welfare spending, see Chernick (1996).
18
 The above-estimated percentage changes following a TANF block grant are based upon these grants
elasticities and the average welfare spending and grants levels reported in Craig and Inman (1986). The
larger effects for poorer states reflect the fact that they will receive a larger percentage increase in block
grant aid from the new TANF grant.
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block grant) and a fall in the rich states from 0 to 18 percent (a 20 percent decline
from the price effect plus either a 2 or 20 percent increase from the TANF grant
effect). The larger declines occur when federal welfare aid is highly fungible from
welfare spending into other areas of the state budget. It remains to be seen how
much of a decline, if any, will finally occur. That there are "maintenance of effort"
provisions in the Welfare Reform Act, requiring that 80 percent of TANF grants be
spent on welfare-related programs, suggests that at least a majority in Congress is
concerned that declines may be significant.19
Of the three principles of federalism specified above, the principle of coop-
erative federalism seems to us to provide the strongest rationale for the federalism
reforms undertaken by the Welfare Reform Act of 1996. For example, the principle
of economic federalism, aimed as it is at internalizing all relevant externalities,
would advocate either full and direct central government provision or the use of
matching aid as the most economically efficient ways of adjusting for fiscal spillovers
between jurisdictions. When providing low-income assistance, there are two sets of
spillovers to be internalized, those on the cost side and those on the benefit side.
On the benefit side, Boadway and Wildasin (1984) emphasize that residents of one
state may derive benefits from the provision of low income assistance in another
state. On the cost side, Gramlich (1985) emphasizes that mobile taxpayers and
mobile poor drive up the costs to states of providing a dollar of benefits to their
own poor residents, since higher taxes and benefits may drive away the residential
or business tax base while attracting additional poor. For both reasons, the private
marginal cost to a state of providing $1 in additional welfare benefits will be larger
than the social marginal cost. If grants are used, the matching rate should be set
to internalize for state politicians these two types of spillovers.20
19
 Even so, we remain skeptical that this maintenance of effort provision alone will have much effect in
preventing states from allocating resources away from poor households if such reallocations are the
politically preferred allocation. Central government rules on state budget allocations are typically very
difficult to enforce.
20
 One can offer a back-of-the-envelope calculation that the recent matching rates used in AFDC were
reasonable adjustments for expected spillovers. The appropriate formula for a matching rate that corrects
for spillovers is: m = (1 – 1/ρ ), where m is the matching rate, ρ is the factor (presumably greater than
1) by which one must multiply the private marginal benefit received from a change in welfare benefits
to account for the benefits felt by those in other jurisdictions, and (also presumably greater than 1)
is the factor by which one must multiply the costs for a state of changing welfare benefits to make up
for the cost spillovers incurred by scaring off or attracting businesses and the poor. Helms (1985) esti-
mates the elasticity of state incomes to a tax-financed increase in welfare benefits to be about .1 and
Blank (1988) estimates the elasticity of welfare immigration to an increase in benefits to also be about
.1. These two effects have an additive impact, so that the private cost to a state of providing an extra $1
of social assistance will be about 20 percent higher than the $1 social cost, or about $1.20; thus can
be taken to equal 1.2. On the benefit side, if we assume that if one state spends an extra $1 on benefits,
it raises the utility of each of the other 49 states by an average of 2 cents, then the social marginal benefit
of having one state spend an additional $1 will be nearly $2 (the $1 spent plus a spillover of
49 × 2 cents). Thus, ρ equals about 2. Using these estimates of and ρ, the matching rate formula
implies an efficient welfare matching rate to control spillovers of .58, close to AFDC's average matching
rate before the welfare reforms.
The more general conclusion that matching rates are an appropriate policy is not very sensitive to
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The principle of democratic federalism also will support the continuation of
direct central government provision or matching aid, again to internalize interstate
spillovers from welfare, though this principle might well advocate reductions in
direct support or matching rates if the evidence points to inefficient current policies
because of political logrolling. After all, welfare spending subsidizes poor families.
In this light, the politics of these subsidies should be no different than the politics
of all subsidies: tax deductions for charitable giving, farm price supports, tariffs, or
low cost loans to cities, states, and non-profit institutions. For some evidence that
welfare has been part of this wider subsidy logroll, see Ferejohn (1983). While lower
matching rates might be justified by the principle of democratic federalism, the
continued presence of cost and benefit spillovers when states provide welfare still
recommends direct central government provision or a targeted matching rate
greater than zero.
Nor can the fiscal reforms in the Welfare Reform Act of 1996 be well-explained
by a shift towards greater concern for the competing constitutional values of polit-
ical participation and the protection of individual liberties. Though one might
justify the back-to-work welfare reforms from a principle of personal liberty, it is
hard to see how the fiscal reforms replacing matching aid with a fungible block
grant enhances personal freedoms. Nor is overall political participation likely to be
greatly affected by the reforms. On one side, increasing state discretion over welfare
policies does take an important step towards local control of policies, which should
enhance participation. However, setting the matching rate at zero significantly
raises the cost to the middle class voters of including lower-income families in any
budget coalition. This may well reduce overall participation in deciding state fiscal
choices. Finally, as long as efficiency is still a valued social objective and the central
government is allowed to set policies, then matching aid, not fungible block grants,
is the better policy.
The principle of cooperative federalism seems to account best for all the major
fiscal reform features of the Welfare Reform Act of 1996. Cooperative federalism
advocates the decentralization of policy to the lower tiers of government with the
federal government's role limited to encouraging efficient agreements between
jurisdictions. The Welfare Reform Act seems to do just that. First, states, not cities
or counties, are chosen by the act as the appropriate unit of government to receive
the new welfare responsibilities. This assignment recognizes the significant mobility
of lower income families and tax base within metropolitan areas (Inman, 1992) as
well as the possibility of significant benefit spillovers between local governments
(Pauly, 1973). States are generally the right unit of government to internalize such
metropolitan-wide spillovers from welfare policies. Further, the Welfare Reform Act
the numbers chosen for ρ and . If the benefit of spending $1 in one state raises utility by only half a
cent in 49 other states, and the cost spillover parameter is 1.1, a still significant matching rate of .27—
almost the matching rate when AFDC was first approved in 1935—is justified. As state economies become
more open, as they surely have over the past 60 years, then the spillover parameters and ρ will increase
and the efficient AFDC matching rate will rise as well, as it has over the past 60 years.
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directly removes a possible interstate spillover from welfare policy by allowing states
to impose residency requirements for the receipt of benefits, although this provi-
sion seems sure to be challenged in court. In short, the Welfare Reform Act seems
designed to assign welfare responsibility to those lower-tier governments (states)
which internalize as many welfare externalities as possible. For any welfare spillovers
that might remain, the act grants states wide latitude to set welfare policies, discre-
tion which should facilitate interstate agreements. Finally, and perhaps most deci-
sively for the view favoring cooperative federalism as the rationale for welfare re-
form, the act drops matching grants in favor of fungible block grants, thereby re-
moving an important impediment to efficient bargaining between states.21
Seen in the light of our three principles of federalism, the recent fiscal reforms
in welfare policy appear to be a significant institutional experiment with an alter-
nate paradigm of federalism, one which emphasizes the ability of states, not the
central government, to handle cross-jurisdiction spillovers. If the experiment proves
successful, then other central government policies like Medicaid (another entitle-
ment poverty program), environmental and business regulation, infrastructure
spending, and perhaps even Social Security and Medicare may become candidates
for fiscal decentralization too.
Conclusion
Rethinking federalism means rethinking the terms under which sovereign cit-
izens or states join together to form a "more perfect union." Whether one is strug-
gling to form a political union for the first time (European Union, South Africa,
Russia), deciding to break away from an existing union (Quebec), or to reform a
stable one (United States), decisions must be made along each of the institutional
dimensions which define the federal constitution: the number of lower-tier govern-
ments, their representation to the central legislature, and the assignment of policy
responsibilities between the center and lower tiers. Whatever federal constitution
is selected will have important implications for the valued goals of government:
economic efficiency, political participation, protection of rights.
Most countries will want to mix and match their federal institutions, depending
on how they view the performance and weigh the goals of government. For exam-
ple, for economic efficiency, lower-tier governments might best be assigned re-
sponsibility for congestible public services; both economic theory and the available
evidence seem to support this allocation. For the problems of pure public goods
and interjurisdictional spillovers, the principle of economic federalism recom-
mends that these goods be assigned to the central government. However, the prin-
21
 As first noted by Buchanan and Stubblebine (1962), central government using taxes or subsidies alone
to internalize spillovers alters the marginal incentives of agents who are bargaining, leading to an inef-
ficient, post-bargain allocation. In other words, Pigovian taxes without compensation is a substitute for,
not a complement to, the Coasian bargain.
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ciples of cooperative federalism and democratic federalism are less clear on the
point. The ability of central governments to provide pure public goods efficiendy
may depend crucially on how representatives are selected for the national legisla-
ture. Locally chosen representatives may place parochial interests above the collec-
tive interest in efficient public goods provision. Cooperative federalism argues for
assigning pure public goods and spillovers to the local level, much as the new
welfare reforms have done; cooperative federalism counts on the ability of inter-
jurisdictional bargaining to allocate such goods better. The principle of democratic
federalism retains central government assignment for pure public goods and spill-
overs but argues for a more rough and ready representation of local interests at the
national level, like recommending nationally elected representatives to a majority-
rule national legislature. Finally, other goals for government will be considered too,
such as political participation and protection of individual rights. These important
constitutional values might favor extensive local representation in the national leg-
islature, even allowing for the potentially significant efficiency costs imposed by a
large constituent-based legislature, or they might favor many local governments and
the local assignment of public goods and spillovers, even recognizing the possibly
large inefficiencies imposed by spillovers left unresolved because of incomplete
interjurisdictional bargains.
As we rethink federalism, we must recognize—as did our Founding Fathers—
that the selection of the institutions of federalism necessarily carries with it a bal-
ancing of these competing social goals of economic efficiency, political participa-
tion, and the protection of individual rights and liberties.
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